Mon 06 Aug 2018 10:42:36 AM -03

"See everything with Hollerith punchcards":


It's worth read on it's entirety.


Impressions not to be held in punch cards.

So we have this huge corporation, an empire built around monopolist practices and information technology. It's pure capitalistic in the sense that it's not bound any specific foreign government political affiliations providing that it buys that information machinery.

Watson's micromanagment style of "the most infinitesimal details" (page 241) is symmetric with IBM's own technologies of control. Shape and being shapen by a technology, as a mutual reflection with infinesimal consequences as multiple mirror-images.

Was Watson before NCR -- and hence before IBM -- a mere seller? An the experience with Patterson's salles manual what changed everything in Watson's mind?

Patterson had created a sales manual designed to rigidly standardize all
pitches and practices, and even mold the thought processes of selling. No
deviation was allowed.

-- 39

Watson sounds like the Steve Jobs equivalent at that era of techno-totalitarianism.

Similarly to that inclination to control and domination, a government like nazi Germany was an automatic customer/partner that exponentiated all potentialities for efficiency -- in the limited, rationalized as an unidimensional sense of efficiency. Note that I'm not using natural to denote, as nature is just the automatic qualities of something.

Total control freaks meet at the dawn of large-scale information technology -- as we cannot say that informational practices did not exist before.

A technology that was designed to operate no matter whats the nature of the "business". Be it commodities, manufacturing, people or war-making management. War-time or logistic-time. Does not matter.

The joint venture of IBM and the Nazis created International Business-As-Usual with Machines of hateful domination.

Even with the noise in the relation as when Watson broke with Hitler, some "unstoppable force" of automation was there to stay and groe -- in the sense that it was already being summoned and the force to stop it would be tremendous.

The unusual of war was converted to the usual of business. No matter is war is being waged, the corporate-form now was immune to it using a complex set-up os nominated trustees, plausible deniability and levels of indirection. It can "dissolve" itself in parts split inside beligerant nations and regroup after the war -- keeping activities mostly unaffected and the profit guaranteed. That is a even higher level of transnationality. It survives beyond localized humours of mankind.

THINK must be put in perspective. Not only in the ink in the printed punch card. Not only as a corporation as a Think Tank and efectivelly an acting tank.

A technology based on the operation of counting and sorting limits thinking to only those two operations. In fact counting enables arithmetic and sorting stablish the decision-making needed by proper computing, putting the whole thought inside a box. Further restriction of thought is installed by allowing it just for the purpose of profit: how to better exploit resources? By selling that junk massivelly, this type of machinic "phylum" spread like cancer and gangraned many brains. Copy is memory; punch card destruction is amnesia. War is peace. Freedom is slavery. The Big Brother, or Big Blue, was an information/disinformation machine.

Punch cards: holes punched in holes distributed in a plane-section. How that confines or enables thought?

The nazi war machine was also an information machine, with an important vulnerability of being too dependent in foreign technology. Hollerith himself was a German descendent. Was that machinery only possible with this combination of "traits" (page 31)? Germanic war-and-blood ideology with american capitalist pragmatism?

Nazism was not only land and blood, but had also a strict and extreme dose of ratiolaism. Not only megalomania, but also extreme obsession.

Impressum ironically punched on a ThinkPad.

An image comparison

At IBM Schoolhouse and Engineering Laboratory Building entrance one could read the "Five Steps to Knowledge" carved at the footsteps (THINK / OBSERVE / DISCUSS / LISTEN / READ):

5 steps


While, at Auschwitz, it was written "Work sets you free" in the entrance gate, above people's head:

Auschwitz Gate

One-dimensional Rationalization as a monotonic misconception of the thought process used for mass extermination. Slave work, death by starvation which would set extermination camp inmates free from work and from data processing.

A strange opposition of what is written in the ground -- for the head look something from above and at the same time leaving the head low while the THINK-good stays above -- and what's written above to be seeing from below, diminished.

That Auschwitz photo also has an iconic "HALT" sign at the entry blockade, which is evocative about the last destination of an information processing in the extermination complex.


The International Holocaust Machines operated through the following stages:

  • Census/identification: initial data aquisition on population, assets and commodities, even livestock.
  • Confiscation: seized goods, assets, etc.
  • Ghettoization and Deportation, through:
    • Sorting punch-card data to pinpoint residency location of undesirables to subsequenttly kidnap them.
    • Efficient management of railway using Holleriths to dispatch undesirables.
  • Concentration and Extermination, by using punch-card technology to manage how each person would die and where it will take place, as well as management of slave work.
  • Internal management of the punch card business, which would include inventory tracking and spoil recovering after the war.

Besides the well known relation between death and money-making during wars, that was a Death Factory: if life could be stated as a long "detour to death", a Death Factory is exactly it's opposite: and acceleration instead of a delay, the acumen of the industrial process at the massive scale.


Somebody ought to sort out the data -- not using punch cards! -- presenting in the book: production inputs, outputs and what's known about profits, royalties and tax avoidance; how money was transfered and invested. Or maybe somebody already did that? Lot's interesting stuff might be discovered by doing a quantitative analysis.

It also might be important to search through patent offices for Hollerith applications.

And creation of organograms and relational charts/maps.


How Holleriths were made? Which were manual and with were automaded procedures? Was an assembly lines and time-controlled manufacturing processes involved? Does Holleriths were involved in management of it's own production?



Machine characteristics:

  • Closed, pattented design.
  • Commercialized only through leasing.
  • Compatible cards between Hollerith machines, "no other machine that might ever be produced" (how?).

Hollerith characteristics:

Just nineteen years old, Hollerith moved to Washington, D.C., to join
the Census bureau. Over dinner one night at the posh Potomac Boat Club,
Director of Vital Statistics, John Billings, quipped to Hollerith, "There ought
to be a machine for doing the purely mechanical work of tabulating popula-
tion and similar statistics." Inventive Hollerith began to think about a solu-
tion. French looms, simple music boxes, and player pianos used punched
holes on rolls or cards to automate rote activity. About a year later, Hollerith
was struck with his idea. He saw a train conductor punch tickets in a special
pattern to record physical characteristics such as height, hair color, size of
nose, and clothing—a sort of "punched photograph." Other conductors
could read the code and then catch anyone re-using the ticket of the original
passenger. 5

Hollerith's idea was a card with standardized holes, each representing a
different trait: gender, nationality, occupation, and so forth. The card would
then be fed into a "reader." By virtue of easily adjustable spring mechanisms
and brief electrical brush contacts sensing for the holes, the cards could be
"read" as they raced through a mechanical feeder. The processed cards could
then be sorted into stacks based on a specified series of punched holes. 6

Millions of cards could be sorted and resorted. Any desired trait
could be isolated—general or specific—by simply sorting and resorting for
data-specific holes. The machines could render the portrait of an entire
population—or could pick out any group within that population. Indeed, one
man could be identified from among millions if enough holes could be
punched into a card and sorted enough times. Every punch card would
become an informational storehouse limited only by the number of holes. It
was nothing less than a nineteenth-century bar code for human beings. 7

-- 31

Since the Census Bureau only needed most of the tabulators once every
decade, and because the defensive inventor always suspected some electri-
cian or mechanic would steal his design, Hollerith decided that the systems
would be leased by the government, not purchased. This important decision
to lease machines, not sell them, would dominate all major IBM business
transactions for the next century. Washington paid Hollerith about $750,000
to rent his machines for the project. Now the inventor's challenge was to find

-- 32

Italy, England, France, Austria, and Germany all submitted orders. Hollerith's
new technology was vi r t ual l y unrivaled. His machines made advanced census
taking possible everywhere in the world. He and he alone would control the
technology because the punchers, sorters, and tabulators were all designed
to be compatible with each other—and with no other machine that might
ever be produced. 12


Other than his inventions, Hollerith was said to cherish three things: his
German heritage, his privacy, and his cat Bismarck. His link to everything
German was obvious to all around him.


For privacy, Hollerith built a tall fence around his home to keep out
neighbors and their pets. When too many cats scaled the top to jump into the
yard, the ever-inventive Hollerith strung electrical wire along the fence, con-
nected it to a battery, and then perched at his window puffing on a cigar.
When a neighbor cat would appear threatening Bismarck's privacy, Hollerith
would depress a switch, sending an electrical jolt into the animal. 16
Hollerith's first major overseas census was organized for the brutal
regime of Czar Nicholas II to launch the first-ever census of an estimated
120 million Russians. Nicholas was anxious to import Hollerith technology.

-- 34

IBM merger

The Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company, or CTR:

The four lackluster firms Flint selected defied any apparent rationale
for merger. International Time Recording Company manufactured time
clocks to record worker hours. Computing Scale Company sold simple retail
scales with pricing charts attached as well as a line of meat and cheese slicers.
Bundy Manufacturing produced small key-actuated time clocks, but, more
importantly, it owned prime real estate in Endicott, New York. Of the four,
Hollerith's Tabulating Machine Company was simply the largest and most
dominant member of the group. 32

Moreover, Flint wanted CTR's helm to be captained by a businessman, not a
technocrat. For that, he chose one of America's up and coming business
scoundrels, Thomas J. Watson.

-- 37

Watson, "Paternalistic and authoritarian"

Watson was a conqueror. From simple merchandise inauspiciously sold
to farmers and townsfolk in rural west-central New York, Watson would go
on to command a global company consumed not with mere customers, but
with territories, nations, and entire populations. He would identify corporate
enemies to overcome and strategies to deploy. Like any conqueror, he would
vanquish all in his way, and then demand the spoils. Salesmanship under
Watson would elevate from one man's personal elixir to a veritable cult of
commercial conquest. By virtue of his extraordinary skills, Watson would be
delivered from his humble beginnings as a late-nineteenth-century horse-
and-buggy back road peddler, to corporate scoundrel, to legendary tycoon,
to international statesman, and finally to regal American icon—all in less
than four decades.

-- 38

Watson began the systematic annihilation of Hallwood, its sales, and its
customer base. Tactics included lurking near the Hallwood office to spy on its
salesmen and customers. Watson would report the prospective clients so
"intimidation squads" could pounce. The squads would threaten the prospect with
tall tales of patent infringement suits by NCR against Hallwood, falsely
claiming such suits would eventually include anyone who purchased Hallwood
machines. The frightened customer would then be offered an NCR machine at a
discount. 43

-- 40

Patterson planted him in New York City, handed him a million-dollar budget,
and asked him to create a fake business called Watson's Cash Register and
Second Hand Exchange. His mission was to join the community of second-
hand dealers, learn their business, set up shop nearby, dramatically undersell,
quietly steal their accounts, intimidate their customers, and otherwise disrupt
their viability. Watson's fake company never needed to make a profit—only
spend money to decimate unsuspecting dealers of used registers. Eventually,
they would either be driven out of business or sell out to Watson with a dra-
conian non-compete clause. Funneled money from NCR was used for opera-
tions since Watson had no capital of his own. 46

-- 41

NCR salesmen wore dark suits, the corporation innovated a One Hun-
dred Point Club for agents who met their quota, and The Cash stressed "clean
living" as a virtue for commercial success. One day during a pep rally to the
troops, Watson scrawled the word THINK on a piece of paper. Patterson saw
the note and ordered THINK signs distributed throughout the company.
Watson embraced many of Patterson's regimenting techniques as indispens-
able doctrine for good sales. What he learned at NCR would stay with him
forever. 53


Patterson, Watson, and several dozen other Cash executives were indicted for
criminal conspiracy to restrain trade and construct a monopoly.


A year later, in 1913, all defendants were found guilty by an Ohio jury.
Damning evidence, supplied by Watson colleagues and even Watson's own
signed letters of instructions, were irrefutable. Most of the men, including
Watson, received a one-year jail sentence. Many of the convicted wept and
asked for leniency. But not Watson. He declared that he was proud of what
he had accomplished. 55

-- 42

Then came the floods.


The Cash pounced. NCR organized an immense emergency relief effort.


Patterson, Watson, and the other NCR men became national heroes over-


Petitions were sent to President Woodrow Wilson asking for a pardon.
Considering public sentiment, prosecutors offered consent decrees in lieu of
jail time. Most of the defendants eagerly signed. Watson, however, refused,
maintaining he saw nothing wrong in his conduct. Eventually, Watson's attorneys
successfully overturned the conviction on a technicality. The government
declined to re-prosecute. 58 But then the unpredictable and maniacal Patterson
rewarded Watson's

-- 42-43

Patterson had demanded starched white shirts and dark suits at NCR. Watson
insisted CTR employees dress in an identical uniform. And Watson borrowed his
own NCR innovation, the term THINK, which at CTR was impressed onto as many
surfaces as could be found, from the wall above Watson's desk to the bottom of
company stationery. These Patterson cum Watson touches were easy to implement
since several key Watson aides were old cronies from the NCR scandal days. 66

-- 45

A "father image":

Watson embodied more than the boss. He was the Leader. He even had a song.
Clad in their uniforms of dark blue suits and glistening white shirts, the
inspirited sales warriors of CTR would sing:

    Mister Watson is the man we're working for,
    He's the Leader of the C-T-R,
    He's the fairest, squarest man we know;
    Sincere and true.
    He has shown us how to play the game.
    And how to make the dough. 70

-- 46

"IBM is more than a business—it is a great worldwide institution that is going
on forever." 74 More than ever. Watson f us e d himself into every facet of IBM's opera-
tions, injecting his style into every decision, and mesmerizing the psyche of
every employee. "IBM Spirit"—this was the term Watson ascribed to the all-
encompassing, almost tribal devotion to company that he demanded.


Children began their indoctrination early, becoming eligible at age three for
the kiddy rolls of the IBM Club, graduating to junior ranks at age eight. 76


Watson's own son, Tom, who inherited his father's throne at IBM,
admitted, "The more I worked at IBM, the more I resented Dad for the cult-
like atmosphere that surrounded him." 78


The ever- present equating of his name with the word THINK was more than an
Orwellian exercise, it was a true-life indoctrination. The Watson mystique was
never confined to the four walls of IBM. His aura was only magnified by

-- 47

Fortune referred to Watson as "the Leader," with a capital "L." So completely
con- scious was Watson of his mythic quality that he eyed even the porters on
trains and waiters in restaurants as potential legend busters. He tossed them
big tips, often as much as $10, which was largesse for the day.


By giving liberally to charities and universities, by towering as a patron
of the arts, by arranging scores of organizational memberships, honorary de-
grees and awards, he further cultivated the man-myth for himself and IBM. 81
Slogans were endlessly drilled into the extended IBM Family. We For-
give Thoughtful Mistakes. There Is No Such Thing As Standing Still. Pack Up
Your Troubles, Mr. Watson Is Here. 82
And the songs. They began the very first day a man entered the IBM
culture. They never ended during one's entire tenure. More than 100 songs
were sung at various company functions. There were several for Watson,
including the "IBM Anthem"


Revival-style meetings enthralled the men of IBM. Swaying as they
chanted harmonies of adulation for the Leader, their palms brought together
in fervent applause in hero worship, fully accepting that their families and
destinies were intertwined with the family and destiny of the corporation,
legions of company men incessandy re-dedicated themselves to the "Ever
Onward" glory of IBM. All of it swirled around the irresistible magnetism,
t h e i nt oxi cat i n g command, the charismatic cultic control of one man,
Thomas J. Watson, the Leader. 84

-- 48-49

IBM and the Third Reich

The question confronting all businessmen in 1933 was whether trading
with Germany was worth either the economic risk or moral descent. This
question faced Watson at IBM as well. But IBM was in a unique commercial
position. While Watson and IBM were famous on the American business
scene, the company's overseas operations were fundamentally below the
public radar screen. IBM did not import German merchandise, it merely
exported American technology. The IBM name did not even appear on any
of thousands of index cards in the address files of leading New York boycott
organizations. Moreover, the power of punch cards as an automation tool
had not yet been commonly identified. So the risk that highly visible trading
might provoke economic retaliation seemed low, especially since Dehomag
did not even possess a name suggestive of IBM or Watson. 101
On the other hand, the anticipated reward in Germany was great.

Watson had learned early on that a government in reorganization, and
indeed a government tighdy monitoring its society, was good news for IBM.
During the Depression years, when the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration
created a massive bureaucracy to assist the public and control business, IBM
doubled its size. The National Recovery Act of 1933, for example, meant
"businesses all of a sudden had to supply the federal government with infor-
mation in huge and unprecedented amounts," recalled an IBM official. Extra
forms, export reports, more registrations, more statistics—IBM thrived on
red tape. 102

Nazi Germany offered Watson the opportunity to cater to government
control, supervision, surveillance, and regimentation on a plane never before
known in human history. The fact that Hitler planned to extend his Reich to
other nations only magnified the prospective profits. In business terms, that
was account growth. The technology was almost exclusively IBM's to purvey
because the firm controlled about 90 percent of the world market in punch
cards and sorters.

-- 52


To be sure, Dehomag managers were as fervently devoted to the Nazi
movement as any of Hitler's scientific soldiers. IBM NY understood this from
the outset. Heidinger, a rabid Nazi, saw Dehomag's unique ability to imbue
the Reich with population information as a virtual calling from God. His
enraptured passion for Dehomag's sudden new role was typically expressed
while opening a new IBM facility in Berlin. "I feel it almost a sacred action,"
declared Heidinger emotionally, "I pray the blessing of heaven may rest
upon this place." 118

That day, while standing next to the personal representative of Watson
and IBM, with numerous Nazi Party officials in attendance, Heidinger pub-
licly announced how in tune he and Dehomag were with the Nazi race scien-
tists who saw population statistics as the key to eradicating the unhealthy,
inferior segments of society.

"The physician examines the human body and determines whether . . .
all organs are working to the benefit of the entire organism," asserted Hei-
dinger to a crowd of Nazi officials. "We [Dehomag] are very much like the
physician, in that we dissect, cell by cell, the German cultural body. We
report every individual characteristic . . . on a little card. These are not dead
cards, quite to the contrary, they prove later on that they come to life when
the cards are sorted at a rate of 25,000 per hour according to certain charac-
teristics. These characteristics are grouped like the organs of our cultural
body, and they will be calculated and determined with the help of our tabu-
lating machine. 119

It was right about this time that Watson decided to engrave the five
steps leading up to the door of the IBM School in Endicott, New York, with
five of his favorite words. This school was the place where Watson would
train his valued disciples in the art of sales, engineering, and technical sup-
port. Those five uppermost steps, steps that each man ascended before enter-
ing the front door, were engraved with the following words:


The fifth and uppermost step was chiseled with the heralded theme of
the company. It said THINK. 122
The word THINK was everywhere.

-- 56-57

The Census

The datacenter:

IN MID - SEPTEMBER , 1933, 6,000 brown cardboard boxes began unceremo- niously
arriving at the cavernous Alexanderplatz census complex in Berlin.  Each box
was stuffed with questionnaires manually filled out by pen and pencil, but soon
to be processed by an unprecedented automated praxis. As supervisors emptied
their precious cargo at the Prussian Statistical Office, each questionnaire—one
per household—was initialed by an intake clerk, stacked, and then transferred
downstairs. "Downstairs" led to Dehomag's massive 22,000-square-foot hall, just
one floor below, specifically rented for the project. 18

Messengers shuttling stacks of questionnaires from the Statistical Office to
Dehomag bounded down the right-hand side of an enclosed stairwell. As they
descended the short flight, the sound of clicking became louder and louder. At
the landing, they turned left and pushed through the doors. As the doors swung
open, they encountered an immense high-ceilinged, hangar-like facility
reverberating with the metallic music of Hollerith technology. Some 450 data
punchers deployed in narrow rows of punching stations labored behind tall
upright secretarial displays perfectly matched to the oversized
census questionnaires. 19

Turning left again, and then another right brought the messengers to a
long windowed wall lined with narrow tables. The forms were piled there.
From these first tables, the forms were methodically distributed to central-
ized desks scattered throughout the work areas. The census forms were then
loaded onto small trolleys and shutded again, this time to individual work
stations, each equipped with a device that resembled a disjointed typewriter
- actually an input engine. 20

A continuous "Speed Punching" operation ran two shifts, and three
when needed. Each shift spanned 7.5 hours with 60 minutes allotted for
"fresh air breaks" and a company-provided meal. Day and night, Dehomag
staffers entered the details on 41 million Prussians at a rate of 150 cards per
hour. Allowing for holidays and a statistical prediction of absenteeism, yet
ever obsessed with its four-month deadline, Dehomag decreed a quota of
450,000 cards per day for its workforce. Free coffee was provided to keep
people awake. A gymnast was brought in to demonstrate graceful aerobics
and other techniques to relieve fatigue. Company officials bragged that the
41 million processed cards, if stacked, would tower two and a half times
higher than the Zugspitze, Germany's 10,000-foot mountain peak. Dehomag
intended to reach the summit on time. 21

As company officials looked down upon a floor plan of the layout, the
linear rows and intersecting columns of work stations must have surely
resembled a grandiose punch card itself animated into a three-dimensional
bricks and mortar reality. Indeed, a company poster produced for the project
showed throngs of miniscule people scrambling over a punch card sketch. 22
The surreal artwork was more than symbolic.

-- 63-64

And the description follows which show how was explicity the wish to target Jews.

Note for error-checking procedure and the "statistical prediction of absenteeism" which imply on the informate aspect of the procedure.

Discretion and secrecy

Watson developed an extraordinary ability to write reserved and clev-
erly cautious letters. More commonly, he remained silent and let subordi-
nates and managers do the writing for him. But they too respected an IBM
code—unwritten, of course—to observe as much discretion as possible in
memos and correspondence. This was especially so in the case of corre-
sponding with or about Nazi Germany, the most controversial business part-
ner of the day.

-- 68

Few understood the far-reaching ramifications of punch card technology and even
fewer had a foreground understanding that the com- pany Dehomag was in fact
essentially a wholly-owned subsidiary of Interna- tional Business Machines.

Boycott and protest movements were ardently trying to crush Hitlerism by
stopping Germany's exports. Although a network of Jewish and non- sectarian
anti-Nazi leagues and bodies struggled to organize comprehensive lists of
companies doing business with Germany, from importers of German toys and shoes
to sellers of German porcelain and pharmaceuticals, yet IBM and Watson were not
identified. Neither the company nor its president even appeared in any of
thousands of hectic phone book entries or handwritten index card files of the
leading national and regional boycott bodies. Anti- Nazi agitators just didn't
understand the dynamics of corporate multi- nationalism. 64

Moreover, IBM was not importing German merchandise, it was export-
ing machinery. In fact, even exports dwindled as soon as the new plant in
Berlin was erected, leaving less of a paper trail. So a measure of invisibility
was assured in 1933.

-- 75


But to a certain extent all the worries about granting Hitler the techno-
logic tools he needed were all subordinated to one irrepressible, ideological
imperative. Hitler's plans for a new Fascist order with a "Greater Germany"
dominating all Europe were not unacceptable to Watson. In fact, Watson
admired the whole concept of Fascism. He hoped he could participate as the
American capitalistic counterpart of the great Fascist wave sweeping the Con-
tinent. Most of all, Fascism was good for business.

THOMAS WATSOON and IBM had separately and jointly spent decades making
money any way they could. Rules were broken. Conspiracies were hatched.
Bloody wars became mere market opportunities. To a supranational, making
money is equal parts commercial Darwinism, corporate ecclesiastics, dynastic
chauvinism, and solipsistic greed.

Watson was no Fascist. He was a pure capitalist. But the horseshoe of
political economics finds little distance between extremities.


After all, his followers wore uniforms, sang songs, and were expected to
display unquestioned loy- alty to the company he led.

Fascism, the dictatorial state-controlled political system, was invented
by Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini. The term symbolically derived from the
Roman fasces, that is, the bundle of rods surrounding a ceremonial axe used
during Roman times. Indeed, Nazi symbols and ritual were in large part
adopted from Mussolini, including the palm-lifting Roman salute. Ironically,
Italian Fascism was non-racial and not anti-Semitic. National Socialism added
those defining elements.

Mussolini fascinated Watson. Once, at a 1937 sales convention, Watson
spoke out in Il Duce's defense. "I want to pay tribute ... [to the] great leader,
Benito Mussolini," declared Watson. "I have followed the details of his work
very carefully since he assumed leadership [in 1922]. Evidence of his leader-
ship can be seen on all sides. . . . Mussolini is a pioneer . . . Italy is going to
benefit gready." 65

Watson explained his personal attraction to the dictator's style and even
observed similarities with his own corporate, capitalistic model. "One thing
which has greatly impressed me in connection with his leadership," con-
ceded Watson, "is the loyalty displayed by the people. To have the loyalty and
cooperation of everyone means progress—and ultimate success for a nation
or an individual business ... we should pay tribute to Mussolini for estab-
lishing this spirit of loyal support and cooperation." 66

For years, an autographed picture of Mussolini graced the grand piano
in Watson's living room. 67

In defense of Fascism, Watson made clear, "Different countries require
different forms of government and we should be careful not to let people in
other countries feel that we are trying to standardize principles of govern-
ment throughout the world." 68

-- 75-76

What an irony: Watson defending non-standardization of goverments around the world...

His access to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and more importantly to
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was unparalleled. While the Hoover Justice
Department was at the height of its anti-trust investigation of IBM in 1932,
Watson donated large sums to the Roosevelt campaign. Roosevelt's election
over Hoover was a landslide. Watson now had entree to the White House
itself. 71

-- 77

A statesman.

So a happy medium was found between Watson's desire to maintain
deniability in IBM's lucrative relations with Germany and his personal desire
to hobnob with Third Reich VIPs. But, the demands of the growing business
in Germany would not be free of Watson's famous micro-management. Too

-- 79

Technology for the "Final Sollution"

IBM did not invent Germany's anti-Semitism, but when it volunteered solutions,
the company virtually braided with Nazism. Like any technologic evolution, each
new solution powered a new level of sinister expectation and cruel capability.

When Germany wanted to identify the Jews by name, IBM showed them how. When
Germany wanted to use that information to launch pro- grams of social expulsion
and expropriation, IBM provided the technologic wherewithal. When the trains
needed to run on time, from city to city or between concentration camps, IBM
offered that solution as well. Ultimately, there was no solution IBM would not
devise for a Reich willing to pay for services rendered. One solution led to
another. No solution was out of the question.

As the clock ticked, as the punch cards clicked, as Jews in Germany saw
their existence vaporizing, others saw their corporate fortunes rise. Even as
German Jewry hid in their homes and wept in despair, even as the world
quietly trembled in fear, there was singing. Exhilarated, mesmerized, the
faithful would sing, and sing loudly to their Leaders—on both sides of the

Some uniforms were brown. Some were blue.

-- 79-80

Corporate schizophrenia

To achieve his goals, each man had to cooperate in an international
campaign of corporate schizophrenia designed to achieve maximum deniability
for both Dehomag and IBM. The storyline depended upon the circumstance
and the listener. Dehomag could be portrayed as the American-controlled, al-
most wholly-owned subsidiary of IBM with token German shareholders and
on-site German managers. Or Dehomag could be a loyal German, staunchly
Aryan company baptized in the blood of Nazi ideology wielding the power
of its American investment for the greater glory of Hitler's Reich.

-- 83

The rhetoric

"The physician examines the human body and determines whether ...
all organs are working to the benefit of the entire organism," asserted Hei-
dinger to a crowd of company employees and Nazi officials. "We [Dehomag]
are very much like the physician, in that we dissect, cell by cell, the German
cultural body. We report every individual characteristic ... on a little card.
These are not dead cards, quite to the contrary, they prove later on that they
come to life when the cards are sorted at a rate of 25,000 per hour according
to certain characteristics. These characteristics are grouped like the organs of
our cultural body, and they will be calculated and determined with the help
of our tabulating machine. 27

"We are proud that we may assist in such a task, a task that provides our
nation's Physician [Adolf Hitler] with the material he needs for his examina-
tions. Our Physician can then determine whether the calculated values are in
harmony with the health of our people. It also means that if such is not the
case, our Physician can take corrective procedures to correct the sick circum-
stances. . . . Our characteristics are deeply rooted in our race. Therefore, we
must cherish them like a holy shrine, which we will—and must—keep pure.
We have the deepest trust in our Physician and will follow his instructions in
blind faith, because we know that he will lead our people to a great future.

-- 88

Automation and efficiency

While Hitler's rhetoric was burning the parade grounds and airwaves,
while Storm Troopers were marching Jews through the streets in ritual
humiliations, while Reich legislative decrees and a miasma of regional and
private policies were ousting Jews from their professions and residences,
while noisy, outrageous acts of persecution were appalling the world, a qui-
eter process was also underway. Germany was automating.
Hollerith systems could do more than count. They could schedule, ana-
lyze, and compute. They could manage.

-- 92


Hitler's Germany began achieving undreamed of efficiencies.

-- 94

Now or then?

People seated in a doctor's office or a welfare line never comprehended the
destiny of routine information about their personal traits and conditions.
Question 11 required a handwritten checkmark if the individual was a for-
eigner. Later, this information was punched into the correlating punch card in
columns 29-30 under nationality. 83

-- 101

Information as money, on paper

The discourse on purity was also present on technology itself, in the form of punch cards produced according rigid specificiations using a paper devoid of "impurities":

WHEN HERMAN HOLLERITH designed his first punch card, he made it the
size of a dollar bill. 94 For IBM, information was money. The more Germany
calculated, tabulated, sorted, and analyzed, the greater the demand for
machines. Equally important, once a machine was leased, it required vast
quantities of punch cards. In many cases, a single tabulation required
thousands of cards. Each card was designed to be used only once, and in a
single operation. When Dehomag devised more in-depth data processing, the
improvements only bolstered card demand. How many punch cards were needed?
Millions - per week. 95

Punch cards sped through the huffing machines of the Third Reich like tiny
high-speed mechanized breaths rapidly inhaled and exhaled one time and one time
only. But Hollerith systems were delicate, precision-engineering instruments
that depended on a precision-engineered punch card manufac- tured to exacting
specifications under ideal conditions. Because electrical current in the
machines sensed the rectangular holes, even a microscopic imperfection would
make the card inoperable and could foul up the en-

So IBM production specifications were rigorous. Coniferous chemical
pulp was milled, treated, and cured to create paper stock containing no
more than 5 percent ash, and devoid of ground wood, calk fibers, process-
ing chemicals, slime carbon, or other impurities that might conduct electric-
ity and "therefore cause incorrect machine sensing." Residues, even in trace
amounts, would accumulate on gears and other mechanisms, eventually
causing jams and system shutdowns. Electrical testing to isolate defective
sheets was mandatory. Paper, when cut, had to lie flat without curl or wrin-
kle, and feature a hard, smooth finish on either side that yielded a "good
snap or rattle." 96

-- 103

There seems to be an equivalent discourse on purity and eugenics during the development of the transistor. Something to check out.

Only IBM could make and sell the unique punch cards for its machines.
Indeed, punch cards were the precious currency of data processing. Depend-
ing upon the market, IBM derived as much as a third of its profit from card
sales. Overseas sales were even more of a profit center. Punch card profits
were enough to justify years of federal anti-trust litigation designed to break
the company's virtual monopoly on their sale and manufacture."
When Herman Hollerith invented his technology at the close of the
previous century, he understood the enduring commercial tactic of prolifer-
ating a single universal system of hardware and ensuring that he alone pro-
duced the sole compatible soft goods. Hollerith was right to size his card like
the dollar. IBM's punch card monopoly was nothing less than a license to
print money.

-- 104

Never before had so many people been identified so precisely, so silently, so
quickly, and with such far-reaching consequences.  The dawn of the Information
Age began at the sunset of human decency.

-- 110

1933 census was just a rehearsal

Top racial experts of the Interior Ministry flew in for the assignment. Working
with drafts shuttled between Hitler's abode and police headquarters, twin
decrees of disenfranchisement were finally patched together. The Law for the
Protec- tion of German Blood and a companion decree entitled the Reich
Citizenship Law deprived Jews of their German citizenship and now used the term
explicitly—Jew, not non-Aryan. Moreover, Jews were proscribed from marry- ing
or having sexual relations with any Aryan.


Laborious and protracted paper searches of individual genealogical
records were possible. But each case could take months of intensive research.
That wasn't fast enough for the Nazis. Hitler wanted the Jews identified en


Once drafted, the Nuremberg regulations would be completely
dependent upon Hollerith technology for the fast, wholesale tracing of Jew-
ish family trees that the Reich demanded. Hollerith systems offered the
Reich the speed and scope that only an automated system could to identify
not only half and quarter Jews, but even eighth and sixteenth Jews. 14


Earlier in 1935, the Party's Race Political Office had estimated the total
number of "race Jews." Thanks to Dehomag's people-counting methods, the
Nazis believed that the 1933 census, which recorded a half million observant
Jews, was now obsolete. Moreover, Nazis were convinced that the often-
quoted total of some 600,000 Jews, which was closer to Germany's 1925
census, was a mere irrelevance. In mid-June 1935, Dr. Leonardo Conti, a key
Interior Ministry raceologist, declared 600,000 represented just the "practic-
ing Jews." The true number of racial Jews in the Reich, he insisted, exceeded
1.5 million. Conti, who would soon become the Ministry's State Secretary for
Health overseeing most race questions, was a key assistant to the officials
rishing to compose the Nuremberg Jewish laws for Hitler. 16

-- 114-115

"Final sollution":

Gesturing fanatically, he [Hitler] concluded with this warning: The new law "is
an attempt at the legal regulation of a problem, which, if it fails, must be
turned over to the Nazi Party for final solution." 22

-- 116


Ironically, while all understood the evil anti-Jewish process underway,
virtually none comprehended the technology that was making it possible,
The mechanics were less than a mystery, they were transparent.
In 1935, while the world shook at a rearmed Germany speeding toward


NAZI GERMANY was IBM's second most important customer after the U.S.


Business was good. Hitler needed Holleriths. Rigid dictatorial control
over all aspects of commerce and social life mandated endless reporting and


IBM was guided by one precept: know your customer, anticipate their needs.

-- 117


Dehomag could do the sorting in-house for a fee. The company bragged that
it possessed the ability to cross-reference account numbers on bank deposits

-- 119

None of Germany's statistical programs came easy. All of them required
on-going technical innovation. Every project required specific customized
applications with Dehomag engineers carefully devising a column and corre-
sponding hole to carry the intended information. Dummy cards were first
carefully mocked-up in pen and pencil to make sure all categories and their
placement were acceptable to both Dehomag and the reporting agency. [...]
Dehomag was Germany's data maestro.

-- 121

New devices never stopped appearing. [...] Many of these devices were of course
dual-purpose. They as routinely helped build Germany's general commercial,
social, and military infrastructure as they helped a heightening tower of Nazi
statistical offensives.  In Germany, some of the devices, such as the IBM
Fingerprint Selecting Sorter, were only usable by Nazi security forces. 46

-- 123

What the alliance meant

Rottke openly conceded the contract between IBM and Heidinger had
"been made under an unlucky star, [and] appears to be the source of all
evil." But he nonetheless warned Watson again that if Heidinger's shares
were transferred to a foreign source Dehomag would probably not be per-
mitted "the use of the word Deutsche (German) as an enterprise recognized
in Germany as German." 126 That disaster had to be avoided at all costs. To
IBM's doctrinaire German managers, including Heidinger, Dehomag repre-
sented far more than just a profit-making enterprise. To them, Dehomag had
the technologic ability to keep Germany's war machine automated, facilitate
her highly efficient seizure of neighboring countries, and achieve the Reich's
swiftly moving racial agenda. If IBM's subsidiary were deemed non-Aryan,
the company would be barred from all the sensitive projects awaiting it.
Hitler's Germany—in spite of itself—would be deprived of the Holleriths it
so desperately required.

From Watson's point of view, Germany was on the brink of unleash-
ing its total conquest of Europe. IBM subsidiaries could be coordinated by

Dehomag into one efficient continental enterprise, moving parts, cards, and
machines as the Reich needed them. The new order that Hitler promised was
made to order for IBM.

In July 1939, Watson arrived in Berlin to personally mediate with Hei-
dinger. A compromise would be necessary. The stakes were too high for the
Nazis. The stakes were too high for capitalism. But it was the Germans who
gave in, deferring on Heidinger's demands for a few months under term
Watson dictated. "Watson now controlled something the Third Reich needed
to launch the next decisive step in the solution of the Jewish question, not
just in Germany—but all of Europe. Until now, the fastest punchers, tabula-
tors, and sorters could organize only by numbers. The results could then be
sorted by sequentially numbered profession, geographic locale, or popula-
tion category. But now Watson had something new and powerful. 127
He had the alphabetizes.

-- 172-173

In Copenhagen, at the ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] Congress,
Watson's pro-Axis proposal exceeded anything the State Department could have
expected. He champi- oned a resolution whereby private businessmen from the
three Axis and three Allied nations would actually supercede their governments
and negoti- ate a radical new international trade policy designed to satisfy
Axis demands for raw materials coveted from other nations. The businessmen
would then lobby their respective governments' official economic advisors to
adopt their appeasement proposals for the sake of averting war. Ironically, the
raw mate- rials were needed by Axis powers solely for the sake of waging war.

On June 28, under Watson's leadership, the ICC passed a resolution again
calling for "a fair distribution of raw materials, food stuffs and other
products . . . [to] render unnecessary the movements of armies across fron-
tiers." To this end, the ICC asked "the governments of France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States . . . each collaborate with
their own leading businessmen . , . with respect to national needs . . . [and
therefore] give all countries of the world a fair opportunity to share in the
resources of the world." 27

Even as Watson angled for Germany to be ceded more raw materials,
Germany was openly raping invaded territories.


No wonder the German delegate to the ICC enthusiastically lauded
Watson's proposal, which only sought to legitimize by private consultation
what the Third Reich was undertaking by force. In his final speech of the
Congress, Watson himself summed up the misery and devastation in the
world as a mere "difference of opinion." His solution of businessmen confer-
ring to divvy up other nations' resources to avoid further aggression was
offered with these words: "We regret that there are unsatisfactory economic
and political conditions in the world today, with a great difference of opinion
existing among many countries. But differences of opinion, freely discussed
and fairly disposed of, result in mutual benefit and increased happiness to all
concerned." 31


One State Department assistant secretary could not help but comment on the
similarity of Watson's suggestion to the Axis' own warlike demands. "This is,
of course, a political question of major world importance," wrote the assistant
secretary, and one upon which we have been hearing much from Germany, Italy and
Japan. It occurs to me that it is most unfortunate that Mr. Thomas J. Watson,
as an American serving as the president of the International Chamber of
Commerce, should have sponsored a resolution of this character. It may well be
that his resolution will return to plague us at some future date." That comment
was written on October 5, 1939. 37 By then it was unnecessary to reply

-- 181-184

Biblical Census

The Bible itself taught that unless specifically ordered by God, the census is
evil because through it the enemy will know your strength:

    I Chronicles 21: Satan rose up against Israel and incited David to take a cen-
    sus of Israel. . . . This command was also evil in the sight of God. . . Then
    David said to God, "I have sinned greatly by doing this. Now I beg you to take
    away the guilt of your servant. I have done a very foolish thing." 78 On
    October 28, 1939, for the Jewish people of Warsaw, everything

-- 195

The Ghetto, The Train and the Print Shop

Now the Reich knew exactly how many Jews were under their jurisdic-
tion, how much nutrition to allocate—as low as 184 calories per person per
day. They could consolidate Jews from the mixed districts of Warsaw, and
bring in Jews from other nearby villages. The transports began arriving.
White armbands with Jewish stars were distributed. Everyone, young or old,
was required to wear one on the arm. Not the forearm, but the arm—visible,
above the elbow. The Warsaw-Malkinia railway line ran right through the pro-
posed ghetto. It was all according to Heydrich's September 21 Express Let-
ter. Soon the demarcated ghetto would be surrounded by barbed wire.
Eventually, a wall went up, sealing the residents of the ghetto from the outside
world. Soon thereafter, the railway station would become the most feared lo-
cation in the ghetto. 83

The Nazi quantification and regimentation of Jewish demographics in
Warsaw and indeed all of Poland was nothing less than spectacular—an al-
most unbelievable feat. Savage conditions, secrecy, and lack of knowledge by
the victims would forever obscure the details of exactly how the Nazis man-
aged to tabulate the cross-referenced information on 360,000 souls within
forty-eight hours.

But this much is known: The Third Reich possessed only one method
of tabulating censuses: Dehomag's Hollerith system. Moreover, IBM was in
Poland, headquartered in Warsaw. In fact, the punch card print shop was just
yards from the Warsaw Ghetto at Rymarska Street 6. That's where they pro-
duced more than 20 million cards.

-- 196

The strategic alliance with Hitler continued to pay off in the cities and
in the ghettos. But now IBM machines would demonstrate their special value
along the railways and in the concentration camps of Europe. Soon the Jews
would become Hollerith numbers.

-- 203

'Blitzkrieg' efficiency

forces of the Reich slaughtered all opposition with a military machine
unparalleled in human history. Blitzkrieg—lightning war—was more than a new
word. Its very utterance signified coordinated death under the murderous
onslaught of Hitler's massive air, sea, and 100,000-troop ground assaults.

-- 204

IBM had almost single-handedly brought modern warfare into the
information age. Through its persistent, aggressive, unfaltering efforts, IBM
virtually put the "blitz" in the krieg for Nazi Germany. Simply put, IBM orga-
nized the organizers of Hitler's war.

Keeping corporate distance in the face of the company's mounting
involvement was now more imperative than ever. Although deniability was
constructed with enough care to last for decades, the undeniable fact was
that either IBM NY or its European headquarters in Geneva or its individual
subsidiaries, depending upon the year and locale, maintained intimate
knowledge of each and every application wielded by Nazis. This knowledge
was inherendy revealed by an omnipresent paper trail: the cards themselves.
IBM—and only IBM—printed all the cards. Billions of them.

-- 213

Even more discretion

Only with great caution could Watson now publicly defend the Hitler
agenda, even through euphemisms and code words. Most Americans would
not tolerate anyone who even appeared to be a Nazi sympathizer or collabo-
rator. So, as he had done since Kristallnacht in late 1938, Watson continued
to insert corporate distance between himself and all involvement in the
affairs of his subsidiaries in Nazi Europe—even as he micro-managed their
day-to-day operations. More than ever, he now channeled his communica-
tions to Nazi Europe through trusted intermediaries in Geneva and else-
where on the Continent. He controlled subsidiary operations through
attorneys and employees acting as nominee owners, following the pattern set
in Czechoslovakia and Poland. 7


Peace was Watson's message.


Ironically, at that very moment, Watson and IBM were in fact Europe's most
successful organizers not of peace, but of the ravages of war.

-- 206-207

Customized, proprietaty tech from a monopoly

How they knew how the card was user for, which would lead to ethical concerns -- but the part of IBM -- and strategic ones -- by the part of the German government:

IBM printed billions of its electrically sensitive cards each year for its
European customers. But every order was different. Each set was meticu-
lously designed not only for the singular client, but for the client's specific
assignments. The design work was not a rote procedure, but an intense col-
laboration. It began with a protracted investigation of the precise data needs
of the project, as well as the people, items, or services being tabulated. This
required IBM subsidiary "field engineers" to undertake invasive studies of
the subject being measured, often on-site. Was it people? Was it cattle? Was it
airplane engines? Was it pension payments? Was it slave labor? Different data
gathering and card layouts were required for each type of application. 44


Once printed, each set of custom-designed punch cards bore its own
distinctive look for its highly specialized purpose. Each set was printed with
its own job-specific layout, with columns arrayed in custom-tailored configu-
rations and then preprinted with unique column labels. Only IBM presses
manufactured these cards, column by column, with the preprinted field topic:
race, nationality, concentration camp, metal drums, combat wounds to leg,
train departure vs. train arrival, type of horse, bank account, wages owed,
property owed, physical racial features possessed—ad infinitum. 46

Cards printed for one task could never be used for another. Factory pay-
roll accounting cards, for example, could not be utilized by the SS in its on-
going program of checking family backgrounds for racial features.


An IBM punch card could only be used once. After a period of months, the
gargantuan stacks of processed cards were routinely destroyed. Billions more
were needed each year by the Greater Reich and its Axis allies, requiring a
sophisticated logisti- cal network of IBM authorized pulp mills, paper
suppliers, and stock trans- port. Sales revenue for the lucrative supply of
cards was continuously funneled to IBM via various modalities, including its
Geneva nexus. 50 Slave labor cards were particularly complex on-going projects.
The Reich was constandy changing map borders and Germanizing city and regional
names. Its labor needs became more and more demanding. This type of punch card
operation required numerous handwritten mock-ups and regular revisions. For
example, MB Projects 3090 and 3091 tracking slave labor involved several
mock-up cards, each clearly imprinted with Deho- mag's name along the edge.
Written in hand on a typical sample was the pro- ject assignment: "work
deployment of POWs and prisoners according to business branches." Toward the
left, a column was hand-labeled "number of employed during the month" next to
another column hand-marked "number of employed at month's end." The center and
right-hand column headings were each scribbled in: French, Belgium, British,
Yugoslavian, Polish. 51 Another card in the series was entitled "registration
of male and female


The delicate machines, easily nudged out of whack by their con-
stant syncopation, were serviced on-site, generally monthly, whether that site
was in the registration center at Mauthausen concentration camp, the SS
offices at Dachau, or the census bureau in any country. 54

-- 214-217

Business plan and practice

Few in the financial community were sur- prised. IBM profits had been in a
steep climb since the day Hitler came to power. 57 Clearly, the war was good to
IBM coffers.  Indeed, in many ways the war seemed an ideal financial
opportunity to Watson. Like many, he fully expected Germany to trample over all
of Europe, creating a new economic order, one in which IBM would rule the data
domain.  Like many, Watson expected that America would stay out of the war, and
when it was over, businessmen like him would pick up the post-war economic
pieces.  In fact, Watson began planning for the post-war boom and a complete

"Our program," asserted Watson, "is for national committees in the individual
countries to study their own problems from the standpoint of what they need
from other countries and what they have to furnish other countries." It was the
same Hitleresque message Wat- son had been preaching for years. Some countries,
both men believed, were simply entided to the natural resources of another. War
could be avoided by ceding these materials in advance. 58 No time was wasted in
making plans.

-- 217-218

But domestic pressue got too high in the US:

The long delayed moment had come. That day, June 6, Watson wrote a
reluctant letter to Adolf Hitler. This one would not be misaddressed or
undelivered. This one would be sent by registered mail and released to the
newspapers. Watson returned the medal Hitler had personally granted—and
he chose to return it publicly via the media. The letter declared: "the present
policies of your government are contrary to the causes for which I have been

-- 222

Dehomag was to become completely Nazified. The hierarchy had plans
for Hollerith machines that stretched to virtually all the Reich's most urgent
needs, from the conflict in Europe to Hitler's war against European Jewry.

-- 227

But Germany was too dependent on IBM automation technologies. In fact dependency on information technology was so high that equipment production could not supply the demand. The automation process might have been exponential, beyond the capacity of the system itself. Information was faster than physical, industrial production:

But the strategic alliance with IBM was too entrenched to simply switch off.
Since the birth of the Third Reich, Germany had automated virtually its entire
economy, as well as most government operations and Nazi Party activities, using
a single technology: Hollerith. Elaborate data operations were in full swing
every- where in Germany and its conquered lands. The country suddenly discov-
ered its own vulnerable over-dependence on IBM machinery.


At the same time, Germany's war industry suffered from a chronic paper and pulp
shortage due to a lack of supply and the diversion of basic pulping ingredients
to war propellants.  Only four specialized paper plants in Germany could even
produce Hollerith


Holleriths could not function without IBM's unique paper. Watson controlled the
paper. 17 Printing cards was a stop-start process that under optimal conditions


Holleriths could not function without cards. Watson controlled the cards. 18
Precision maintenance was needed monthly on the sensitive gears, tum-


Even working at peak capacity in tandem with recently opened IBM factories in
Germany, Austria, Italy, and France, Nazi requests for sorters, tabulators, and
collators were back-ordered twenty-four months. Hollerith systems could not
function without machines or spare parts. Watson controlled the machines and
the spare parts. 19

Watson's monopoly could be replaced—but it would take years. Even
if the Reich confiscated every IBM printing plant in Nazi-dominated Europe,
and seized every machine, within months the cards and spare parts would
run out. The whole data system would quickly grind to a halt. As it stood in
summer 1941, the IBM enterprise in Nazi Germany was hardly a stand-
alone operation; it depended upon the global financial, technical, and ma-
terial support of IBM NY and i t s seventy worldwide subsidiaries. Watson
controlled all of it.

Without punch card technology, Nazi Germany would be completely
incapable of even a fraction of the automation it had taken for granted,
Returning to manual methods was unthinkable. The Race and Settlement

-- 228-230

If Watson allowed the Reich—in a fit of rage over the return of the medal—to
oust IBM technologic supremacy in Nazi Germany, and if he allowed Berlin to
embark upon its own ersatz punch card industry, Hitler's data automation
program might speed toward self-destruction. No one could predict how
drastically every Reich undertaking would be affected. But clearly, the blitz
IBM attached to the German krieg would eventually be sub- tracted if not
severely lessened. All Watson had to do was give up Dehomag as the Nazis
demanded. If IBM did not have a technologic stranglehold over Germany, the
Nazis would not be negotiating, they would simply seize what- ever they wanted.
For Watson, it was a choice.


But Watson would not detach Dehomag from the global IBM empire.

-- 235

Albert empha- sized that in the very near future, "a minority of shares might
be even materi- ally of higher value than the present majority." He added that
the notion of stockholder "control" was actually becoming a passe notion in
Germany since the Reich now direcdy or indirectly controlled virtually all
business.  "A majority of shares," he wrote Watson, "does not mean as much as
it used to . . . [since] a corporation, company, enterprise or plant
manufacturing in Germany is so firmly, thoroughly and definitely subjected to
the governmen- tal rules and regulations." 46

-- 237

For IBM, war would ironically be more advantageous than existing

Under the current state of affairs, IBM's assets were blocked in Ger-
many until the conflict was over. Under an enemy custodian, those same
marks would still be blocked—again until any war was over. As it stood, Hei-
dinger was threatening daily to destroy Dehomag unless IBM sold or re-
duced its ownership; and he was demanding to cash out his stock. But if war
with the U.S. broke out, Heidinger and the other managers would be sum-
marily relieved of their management authority since technically they repre-
sented IBM NY. A government custodian chosen on the basis of keen
business skills—and Albert might have the connections to select a reliable
one—would be appointed to replace Heidinger and manage Dehomag. In
fact, the Nazi receiver would diligendy manage all of IBM's European sub-
sidiaries. The money would be waiting when the war was over. 56

Plausible deniability would be real. Questions—would not be asked by IBM NY.
Answers-would not be given by IBMers in Europe or Reich officials. 58

-- 240-241


The company that lionized the word THINK now thought better of its
guiding mandate.

-- 241-242

IBM should rely on its decided technologic edge, suggested Chauncey,
because of the profound difficulty in starting a punch card industry from
scratch, especially if New York could block French Bull competition. In spite
of the quality of its devices, French Bull was a very small company with very
few machines. Bull's one small factory could never supply the Reich's conti-
nental needs. Ramping up for volume production—even if based within a
Bull factory—would take months. Hitler didn't have months in his hour-to-
hour struggle to dominate Europe. In a section entided "Length of Time for
Competition to Come in Actuality," Chauncey argued, "Unless the authori-
ties, or the new company, operate in the meantime from the French Bull fac-
tory, it would appear that much time may elapse before such new company
[could] ... furnish machines in Germany." 103

-- 257

It seemed that in spite of its autarkic impulses and collective rage
against Watson, the cold fact remained: Nazi Germany needed punch cards.
It needed them not next month or even next week. It needed them every
hour of every day in every place. Only IBM could provide them.
"My inclination is to fight," Chauncey declared straight out. But the
battle would be difficult. He knew that IBM was fighting a two-front psycho-
economic war: Heidinger's demand to cash in his stock, and Nazi Party
demands to take over the subsidiary. Clearly, the two were organically linked,


As for IBM's fight with the Nazi Party, Chauncey reiterated his willing-
ness to "make any representations to the authorities that our managers need
not reveal any information of the activities of Dehomag's customers... . but I
cannot get the actual persons out in the open." 107 That chance would now
come. After weeks of remaining in the background, Dr. Edmund Veesen-
mayer would finally come forward.

-- 258

IBM as a company would know the innermost details of Hitler's Holle-
rith operations, designing the programs, printing the cards, and servicing the
machines. But Watson and his New York directors could erect a wall of credi-
ble deniability at the doors of the executive suite. In theory, only those down
the hall in the New York headquarters who communicated direcdy with IBM
Geneva, such as IBM European General Manager Schotte, could provide a
link to the reality in Europe. But in fact, any such wall contained so many
cracks, gaps, and hatches as to render it imaginary. The free flow of informa-
tion, instructions, requests, and approvals by Watson remained detailed and
continuous for years to come—until well into 1944.


Using codes and oblique references, they nonetheless all spoke the
same language, even when the language was vague.


Millions of punch cards were routinely shipped from IBM in America
directly to Nazi-controlled sources in Poland, France, Bulgaria, and Belgium,
or routed circuitously through Sweden or colonies in Africa. When IBM's
American presses did not fill orders, subsidiaries themselves would ship
cards across frontiers from one IBM location to another. 125

-- 264-265

Such knowledge would in fact interest the allies. But curiously the State Deparment acted as a "postman" during "DURING IBM'S day-to-day struggle to stay in the Axis during wartime" (page 277):

The Department's desire to secretly advance the commercial causes of
IBM persevered in spite of the nation's officially stated opposition to the
Hitler menace. For this reason, it was vital to Watson that nothing be done to
embarrass or even annoy the Department publicly. This caution was only
heightened by an on-going FBI investigation into IBM's operation as a
potential hotbed of Nazi sympathizers. Avoiding embarrassing moments was
difficult given the far-flung global empire of IBMers so deeply involved with
Fascist and Axis countries, and accustomed to speaking supportively of their
clients' military endeavors.

-- 277

That was before the US entering the war.

The new board

During all the genocide years, 1942-1945, the Dehomag that Watson
fought to protect did remain intact. Ultimately, it was governed by a special
Reich advisory committee representing the highest echelons of the Nazi hier-
archy. The Dehomag advisory committee replaced the traditional corporate
board of directors. As with any board, the committee's duty was to advise


Four men sat on the advisory board. One was a trustee. Second was
Passow, chief of the Maschinelles Berichtwesen. Third was Heidinger. Fourth
was Adolf Hitler's personal representative. 160

Hitler's representative on Dehomag's advisory committee was Dr. Edmund
Veesenmayer. 161

-- 271

General Ruling 11

As America advanced toward the moment it would enter the war, the
Roosevelt Administration had recendy espoused General Ruling 11, an
emergency regulation forbidding any financial transactions with Nazi Ger-
many without a special Treasury Department license involving written justifi-
cations. Even certain corporate instructions of a financial nature were subject
to the rule. This was something completely new to contend with in IBM's
Nazi alliance. IBM would now be required to seek a complicated, bureau-
cratic approval for each financial instruction it ordered for its overseas sub-
sidiaries under Nazi control. General Ruling 11 would not affect subsidiaries
in neutral countries, such as Sweden or Switzerland. Even still, it would
severely hamper all communications with Dehomag itself, and open a gov-
ernment window into many of IBM's complex transactions. 51
How much time did IBM have?

-- 288

Now it appeared that General Ruling 11 had been violated.

-- 291

IBM would not place a stop on any of its Dehomag business, or any
subsidiary's interaction with it. IBM filed another request with the Treasury
Department, this time to send an instruction to all of its European sub-
sidiaries and agencies, as well, as its divisions in Japan. The instruction: "In
view of world conditions we cannot participate in the affairs of our compa-
nies in various countries as we did in normal times. Therefore you are
advised that you will have to make your own decisions and not call on us for
any advice or assistance until further notice." It was sent to the State Depart-
ment on October 10, 1941, with a request for comment. 77

-- 293

December, just days before Pearl Harbor, to circumvent Treasury license
requirements and issue financial instructions to Dehomag. Ultimately, after
the U.S. joined the war against Germany, Westerholt was appointed the cus-
todian of CEC. 39 The Nazis were able to do with CEC as they pleased so
long as IBM was paid. The looming competition with Bull never came
to fruition. It was more of a bargaining chip than a genuine threat. Unable to
replace IBM, the Third Reich pressured the company into relinquishing Wat-
son's troublesome micro-managing in favor of the faster and more coordi-
nated action the Reich required.

-- 306

Holland and France

Germany wanted the Jews identified by bloodline not religion, pauper-
ized, and then deported to camps, just as they were elsewhere in conquered
Europe. The Jews of France stood vulnerable under the shadow of destruc-
tion. Hitler was ready.

In France, the Holleriths were not.

-- 307

In 1936, as Inspector of Population Registries, Lentz standardized local
population registers and their data collection methodology throughout the
Netherlands—an administrative feat that earned him a royal decoration. That
same year, he outlined his personal vision in Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv,
the journal of the German Statistical Society: "Theoretically," predicted
Lentz, "the collection of data for each person can be so abundant and com-
plete, that we can finally speak of a paper human representing the natural
human." 46


His motto was "to record is to serve." 47

-- 308-309

Ten days after the census ordered by decree V06/41 was fully com-
piled, punched, and sorted, Nazi authorities demanded all Jews wear the
Jewish star. Again a number of Dutch people reacted with outrage and
protest. British diplomats reported that in one town, when the burgomaster
ordered Jews to affix the star, many non-Jews wore one as well. 87
But it was not the outward visage of six gold points worn on the chest
for all to see on the street, it was the 80 columns punched and sorted in a
Hollerith facility that marked the Jews of Holland for deportation to concen-
tration camps. The Germans understood this all too well.

-- 316

Arthur Seyss-Inquart, German Kommissar for Holland: 'Thanks to decree
6/41, all Dutch Jews are now in the bag." 88

FRANCE EXCELLED at many things. Punch card automation was not one of
them. Although IBM had been able to install several hundred Hollerith
devices, mainly for high-volume military, railway, and banking users, Reich
forces had in large part confiscated those machines

-- 317

Oppressive Nazi rule could have dictated its iron will to all reluctant
French authorities, and conquered the demographic uncertainties of a
French Jewry in two zones if only the Holleriths could be deployed. That is
precisely what Holleriths brought to any problem—organization where there
was disorder and tabular certainty where there was confusion. The Nazis
could have punch-carded the Jews of France into the same genocidal sce-
nario in force elsewhere, including Holland. But in the aftermath of the MB's
technologic ravages, France's punch card infrastructure was simply incapable
of supporting the massive series of programs Berlin required. Even if the
machines could have been gathered, transferred, or built—CEC just didn't
have the punch cards.

-- 319

Rene Carmille, comp- troller general of the French Army, had for years been an
ardent advocate of punch cards. More than that, he had machines in good working
order at his government's Demographic Service. Carmille came forward and
offered to end the census chaos. He promised that his tabulators could deliver
the Jews of France. 119

-- 324

Carmille had been working for months on a national Personal Identifi-
cation Number, a number that would not only be sequential, but descriptive.
The thirteen-digit PIN number would be a manual "bar code" of sorts
describing an individual's complete personal profile as well as professional
skills in great detail. For example, one number would be assigned for metal
workers, with a second modifying number for brass, and then a third modi-
fying number for curtain rods. Tabulators could then be set to whisk
through millions of cards until it located French metal workers, specializing
in brass with experience in curtain rods. Those metal workers could also be
pinpointed in any district. The system mimicked a concurrent Reich codifica-
tion system that assigned a descriptive bar code-like number to every prod-
uct and component in Germany. Carmille's number would ultimately evolve
into France's social security number. 123

-- 325

"We are no longer dealing with general censuses, but we are really following
individuals." Carmille made clear, "the new organization must now be envisioned
in such a way that the information be obtained continuously, which means that
the updating of information must be carefully regulated." 127 Carmille was now
France's great Hollerith hope.

-- 328-329

Clearly, Carmille was running an active tabulator operation. Why wasn't
he producing the Jewish lists?


Just days after the French mobilized in Algeria the Nazis discovered
that Carmille was a secret agent for the French resistance. He had no inten-
tion of delivering the Jews. It was all a cover for French mobilization.


Carmille had deceived the Nazis. In fact, he had been working with
French counter-intelligence since 1911. During the worst days of Vichy,
Carmille was always considered one of the highest-placed operatives of the
French resistance, a member of the so-called "Marco Polo Network" of sabo-
teurs and spies. Carmille's operation had generated some 20,000 fake iden-
tity passes. And he had been laboring for months on a database of 800,000
former soldiers in France who could be instandy mobilized into well-
planned units to fight for liberation. Under his plan, 300,000 men would be
ready to go. He had their names, addresses, their military specialties, and all
their occupational skills. He knew which ones were metal workers specializ-
ing in curtain rods, and which were combat-ready troops. 154
As for column 11 asking for Jewish identity, the holes were never
punched—the answers were never tabulated. 155 More than 100,000 cards
of Jews sitting in his office—never handed over. 156 He foiled the entire

-- 332-333

In early 1944, SS security officers ordered Carmille arrested. He was
apprehended in Lyon at noon on February 3, 1944. He was taken to the
Hotel Terminus where his interrogator was the infamous Butcher of Lyon,
Klaus Barbie. Barbie was despised as a master of torture who had sadistically
questioned many members of the resistance. Carmille went for two days
straight under Barbie's hand. He never cracked. 159

-- 334

It never stopped in Holland. The Population Registry continued to
spew out tabulations of names. The trains continued to roll.
Meanwhile, in France, the Germans also deported Jews to death camps
as often as possible. But in France, Nazi forces were compelled to continue
their random and haphazard round-ups. 168

Carmille was sent to Dachau, prisoner 76608, where he died of exhaus-
tion on January 25, 1945. He was posthumously honored as a patriot
although his role in dramatically reducing the number of Jewish deaths in
France was never really known and in some cases doubted. How many lives
he saved will never be tabulated. After the war, Lentz explained he was just a
public servant. He was tried, but only on unrelated charges, for which he was
sentenced to three years inprison. 169

Holland had Lentz. France had Carmille. Holland had a well-entrenched
Hollerith infrastructure. France's punch card infrastructure was in complete

-- 336

American Property

So even though corporate parents, such as IBM, were not
permitted to communicate with their own subsidiaries because they were in
Axis territory, these companies were deemed American property to be pro-
tected. In fact, since IBM only leased the machines, every Dehomag machine,
whether deployed at the Waffen-SS office in Dachau or an insurance office in
Rome, was considered American property to be protected. 10

-- 342

War, Computing, Cryptography and Meteoroloy

IBM and its technology were in fact involved in the Allies' most top-
secret operations. The Enigma code crackers at Bletchley Park in England
used Hollerith machines supplied by IBM's British licensee, the British Tabu-
lating Machine Company. Hut 7 at Bletchley Park was known as the Tabulating
Machine Section. As early as January 1941, the British Tabulating Machine
Company was supplying machines and punch cards not only to Bletchley
Park, but to British intelligence units in Singapore and Cairo as well. 40

Park, but to British intelligence units in Singapore and Cairo as well. 40
By May 1942, IBM employees had joined America's own cryptographic
service. A key man was Steve Dunwell, who left Endicott's Commercial Re-
search Department to join other code breakers in Washington, D.C. The
group used a gamut of punch card machines made by IBM as well as Rem-
ington Rand to decipher intercepted Axis messages. Captured enemy code
books were keyed into punch cards using overlapping strings of fifty digits.
The punched cards were sorted. Each deciphered word was used to attack
another word until a message's context and meaning could laboriously be
established. At one point, Dunwell needed a special machine with electro-
mechanical relays that could calculate at high speed the collective probability
of words that might appear in a theoretical message bit. Dunwell sought per-
mission from Watson to ask that the device be assembled at IBM. Watson
granted it.

It was an irony of the war that IBM equipment was used to encode and
decode for both sides of the conflict. 42

IBM was there even when the Allies landed at Normandy on June 6,
1944. Hollerith machines were continuously used by the Weather Division of
the Army Air Forces to monitor and predict t h e tempestuous storms afflicting
the English Channel. When Al lied troops finally landed at Normandy, MRUs
went in soon after the beachhead was secured. 43
War had always been good to IBM. In America, war income was with-

-- 348

IBM machines were not just used to wage war. They were also used to
track people. Holleriths organized millions for the draft. Allied soldiers miss-
ing in action, as well as captured Axis prisoners, were cataloged by IBM sys-

-- 349

Untouchable and beyond reach of any nation

IBM and Watson were untouchable. Carter learned the immutable truth in the very
words he had written months earlier:

    This [World War] is a conflict of warlike nationalistic states, each having cer-
    tain interests. Yet we frequently find these interests clashing diametrically
    with the opposing interests of international corporate structures, more huge
    and powerful than nations.


IBM was in some ways bigger than the war. Both sides could not afford
to proceed without the company's all-important technology. Hitler needed
IBM. So did the Allies.

-- 352

One could never escape his code (p. 367), Hollerith erfasst: the Logistics of Genocide (p. 375)

For the Allies, IBM assistance came at a crucial point. But for the Jews
of Europe it was too late. Hitler's Holleriths had been deployed against them
for almost a decade and were continuing without abatement. Millions of
Jews would now suffer the consequences of being identified and processed
by IBM technologies.

After nearly a decade of incremental solutions the Third Reich was
ready to launch the last stage. In January 1942, a conference was held in
Wannsee outside Berlin. This conference, supported by Reich statisticians
and Hollerith experts, would outline the Final Solution of the Jewish prob-
lem in Europe. Once more, Holleriths would be used, but this time the Jews
would not be sent away from their offices or congregated into ghettos. Ger-
many was now ready for mass shooting pits, gas chambers, crematoria, and
an ambitious Hollerith-driven program known as "extermination by labor"
where Jews were systematically worked to death like spent matches.
For the Jews of Europe, it was their final encounter with German

-- 354

The multitude of columns and codes punched into Hollerith and sorted
for instant results was an expensive, never-ending enterprise designed to
implement Hitler's evolving solutions to what was called the Jewish problem.
From Germany's first identifying census in 1933, to its sweeping occupa-
tional and social expulsions, to a net of ancestral tracings, to the Nuremberg
definitions of 1935, to the confiscations, and finally to the ghettoizations, it
was the codes that branded the individual and sealed his destiny. Each code
was a brick in an inescapable wall of data. Trapped by their code, Jews could
only helplessly wait to be sorted for Germany's next persecution. The system
Germany created in its own midst, it also exported by conquest or subver-
sion. As the war enveloped all Europe, Jews across the Continent found
themselves numbered and sorted to one degree or another.

By early 1942, a change had occurred. Nazi Germany no longer killed
just Jewish people. It killed Jewish populations. This was the data-driven
denouement of Hitler's war against the Jews.

Hollerith codes, compilations, and rapid sorts had enabled the Nazi
Reich to make an unprecedented leap from individual destruction to some-
thing on a much larger scale.

-- 369

Der Fuhrer was now deter- mined to unleash a long contemplated campaign of
systematic, automated genocide, thus once and for all ridding the world of
Jews. 68

-- 370

By early 1944, Korherr was able to report to Eichmann a total of 5 million Jews
eliminated by "natural decrease, con- centration camp inmates, ghetto inmates,
and those who were [simply] put to death." 88


More than a statistical bureau, by its very nature, the Hollerith complex at
Friedrichstrasse helped Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, and Eichmann prioritize,
schedule, and manage the seemingly impossible logistics of genocide across
dozens of cities in more than twenty countries and territories. It was not just
people who were counted and marshaled for deportation. Boxcars, locomotives,
and intricate train timetables were sched- uled across battle-scarred
borders—all while a war was being fought on two fronts. The technology had
enabled Nazi Germany to orchestrate the death of millions without skipping a

Amidst the whirlwind of the Final Solution, the Third Reich's transition
from the blind persecution of a general population to the destruction of indi-
viduals had come full circle. In genocide, the Jews lost their identity. They
had been reduced to mere nameless data bits. Now each murdered Jew no
longer even represented an individual death. Now every corpse comprised a
mere component in a far larger statistical set adding up to total annihilation.

-- 375

Business Philosophy of "The Sollutions Company" (page 429)

Perhaps IBM's business philosophy was best expressed by an executive
of Beige Watson in an August 1939 letter to senior officers of IBM NY. The
letter detailed the company's growing involvement in Japan's aircraft indus-
try. The IBM Brussels executive declared: "It is none of our business to
judge the reasons why an American corporation should or would help a for-
eign Government, and consequently Mr. Decker and myself have left these
considerations entirely out of our line of thought. ... we are, as IBM men,
interested in the technical side of the application of our machines." 102
But as European territory was liberated in late 1944 and early 1945,

-- 399

Fellinger even put IBM's interest before that of the Third Reich, con-
stantly badgering Berlin to pay more rent, and clear up its delinquencies.
He even demanded that the Wehrmacht pay for CEC machines the German
military seized from occupied France. It took months of burdensome legal
wrangling, but Fellinger successfully argued that the German military had no
right to remove CEC's machines without properly compensating IBM. His
argument hammered away at the theme that because the plundered machines
were leased items, they never belonged to the French government, but to IBM.
As such, the transferred devices were not subject to traditional rules of "war
booty." Only after reams of Fellinger's dense briefs, supported by attestations
by CEC Managing Director Roger Virgile, did the MB finally consent to nearly
a million Reichsmarks in back rent for machines transported out of France. 19

-- 407

Eventually, after ceaseless efforts, IBM NY regained control of its Ger-
man subsidiary. The name had been changed, the money regained, the
machines recovered, the record clear. For IBM the war was over.

But for the descendants of 6 million Jews and millions of other Euro-
peans, the war would never be over. It would haunt them and people of con-
science forever. After decades of documentation by the best minds, the most
studied among them would confess that they never really understood the
Holocaust process. Why did it happen? How could it happen? How were they
selected? How did the Nazis get the names? They always had the names.

What seemingly magical scheduling process could have allowed mil-
lions of Nazi victims to step onto train platforms in Germany or nineteen
other Nazi-occupied countries, travel for two and three days by rail, and then
step onto a ramp at Auschwitz or Treblinka—and within an hour be marched
into gas chambers. Hour a f t e r hour. Day a f t er day. Timetable after timetable.

Like clockwork, and always with blitzkrieg efficiency.
The survivors would never know. The liberators who fought would
never know. The politicians who made speeches would never know. The
prosecutors who prosecuted would never know. The debaters who debated
would never know.

The question was barely even raised.

-- 429-430

"IBM does not have much information about this period"

-- 433

IBM stuck to its story that the "Information Company" had no information about
the documents in its own archives, and had transferred some documents to
esteemed institutions for study.

-- 452


  • Contract irregularities and American taxpayers subsidizing Hollerith, 34.
  • Statistics, "race statistics", intellectual shock troops, 53-55.
  • Tax avoidance, 65-66.
  • Plan for a tower centralizing all the information, 97-98.
  • Organized sterilization, 99.
  • Slogan: "Hollerith illuminates your company, provides surveillance and helps organize", 110.
  • Powers Machine Company, specialized, old and still functioning, like a niche technology, 108.
  • Punch card and equipment production in numbers, 123-124.
  • Accounting manipulation, 126-130.
  • Meeting with Mussolini, 137.
  • Meeting with Hitler, '"Heil!" 108 Watson lifted his right arm halfway up before he caught himself', 138.
  • Watson wearing a medal with swastikas, 140.
  • Office of Automated Reporting (Maschinelles Berichtwesen) and an "universal punch code system", 158-159.
  • Animal censuses, 211.
  • Monopoly and anti-trust ligitations, proprietary technology, 36, 213-214; monopoly and Soviet government, 243.
  • FBI investigation on germans at the IBM, 219-220.
  • Examples use for punch cards in nazi-Germany, 215-216, 373; at page 230 it's mentioned the "Race and Setdement Office", "a marriage-assistance bureau for SS officers" "who fulfilled the [racial] requirements for marriage", a pre-tinder automated dating agency that could not run correctly due to difficult access to Hollerith machines.
  • Bizarre "alien" corporation management by a trustee in war-declared situations (Alien Property Custodian) with plausible deniability, destruction of evidence and layers of indirection, 238-241.
  • IBM and State Department, 242.
  • Watson was a micromanager, micromanagement (many places in the book).
  • Money/revenue flow, 252.
  • Patent war, 258 and other pages.
  • Nazi-Germany and other US companies, 259.
  • Irish Republican Army, 260.
  • Ustashi croatian militia, 260.
  • International Telephone Company reorganization in Spain; company re-organization under fascist-regimes, 262.
  • Competitors: Bull in France, Powers in the US, Kamatec in Holland, 263.
  • Veesenmayer: "technical scheduler of actual genocide", 268.
  • Network of Hollerith systems installed at railroad junctions; relation between punch cards and trains, 270.
  • Tulard file, a form system from 1941, 322.
  • Notice from the Jewish Underground, 331.
  • Holland and France in numbers: death-ratios (Jews counted / murdered) of 73% versus 25%, 336.
  • Control in Business Machines, corporation as an "international monster" (which sounds like a "transleviathan"), 339.
  • Argument that Hollerith patents should belong to the US Government "in the first place", 340.
  • Watson motive to be "in the international peace movement", 340.
  • IBM guns, grenades and masks, 346.
  • Final Solution, 370.
  • Daily death-rate at Auschwitz getting higher and outpassing Hollerith capacity, giving place to improvised number schemes; decrease of order, 357-358.
  • Mengele and his own distinct numbers tatooed on inmates, 357.
  • Protocol for mass Jewish extermination, 370.
  • Switzerland: "switchboard for Nazi-era commercial intrigue"; banks as annomization proxies, 395.
  • Document fabrication "to demonstrate compliance when the opposite was true" and client "blacklisting", 397.
  • Watson's letter to all subsidiaries on enemy territory stating that now they were on their own, which in practice was only partially true 293, 398.
  • The role of a neutral country to put a subsidiary as a proxy - or a "nexus" (page 399) - between a corporation and it's branches on enemy territories; in the case of IBM it was on Geneva, Switzerland, "a clearing office between the local organizations (...) and the New York Headquarters", 395-399.
  • Validity of "punch card signature", 407.
  • IBM Soldiers, 409.
  • Reparation avoidance after the war, 422.
  • Simultaneus translation technology during the Nuremberg Trials, by IBM and free-of-charge, 425.
  • Hollerith usage by Allies, 426.
  • IBM exemption, 426.
  • Another Census, 428.
  • Book "The History of Computing in Europe", 429.
  • Manual punch card sorting by concentration camp inmates, 432.
  • The Hollerith Bunker, 432.
  • Caloric intake rationing, 196, 443.
  • Defensive Documentation, 446.
  • IBM Klub and House of Data, 449.
  • Investigation that required "Holocaust knowledge with an emphasis on Hitler-era finance, added to information-technology expertise, sifted through the dogged techniques of an investigative reporter", 454.
  • Local and central processing facilities -- like Berlin and Oranienburg, 455.